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POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF MCFEE V. NURSING CARE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA
Jessica Monroe*

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 2010 women became the majority on the nation‘s
payrolls for the first time in United States history.1 Most women in the
workforce will become pregnant at some point in their working lives,2
making employers‘ treatment of pregnant women an extremely
significant national issue.
Take, for example, the case of Tiffany McFee, who requested leave
from her job as a nurse due to a pregnancy-related condition.3 Instead of
granting her request, her employer, Pataskala Oaks, fired her six days
after she went on leave and only three days after giving birth to her
child.4 McFee had worked at Pataskala Oaks for eight months, but her
employer‘s policy required a year of service before allowing employees
to take unpaid leave.5 The Supreme Court of Ohio held that her
termination did not constitute pregnancy discrimination because her
employer denied all disability leave for all employees with less than a
year‘s service.6
This Casenote will analyze the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s recent
decision in McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America7 as
evidence of the long overdue change needed in pregnancy
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank her family, Saul Meyerson-Knox, and Chelsea Devine for their support and encouragement.
The author would also like to thank her colleagues on the University of Cincinnati Law Review for their
guidance.
1. Zoe Savitsky, Inertia and Change: Findings of The Shriver Report and Next Steps, 25
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 172, 173 (2010).
2. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J.
567, 579 (2010).
3. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 483 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio
2010).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio 2010).
7. Id.
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discrimination law. The current state of the law fails to promote gender
equality in the workplace because the law insists on ignoring that only
women become pregnant and risk losing their jobs because of
pregnancy. Until the law takes into account the medical and social
realities of pregnancy, women will not truly have equal opportunity in
employment. By admitting that pregnancy is not a ―disability,‖ society
can cease comparing pregnant workers to nonpregnant workers and start
building a framework for pregnancy policies that benefit women,
families, and businesses.
Part II of this Casenote provides a brief background of the federal
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and relevant cases interpreting the
legislation. Part II then describes Ohio‘s pregnancy discrimination law.
Part III summarizes the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in McFee.
Part IV considers the opinion‘s arguments as well as its problematic
public policy ramifications. Finally, Part V concludes that in light of the
decision in McFee, legislative action is needed to protect Ohio workers
from pregnancy discrimination.
II. THE PDA, FMLA, AND RELEVANT CASE LAW
Several pieces of state and federal legislation, fueled by numerous
and sometimes conflicting approaches, have attempted to protect
employees from pregnancy discrimination. This Part will provide a
summary of pregnancy discrimination law and precedent relevant to the
arguments made in McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America.
Subpart A provides a brief overview of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and relevant case law. Next, subpart B briefly explains how the
Family and Medical Leave Act attempted to address the shortcomings of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Finally, subpart C provides a general
overview of Ohio‘s pregnancy discrimination laws and their application
in Ohio courts.
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to equalize
employment opportunities and remove ―artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
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invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification[s].‖8 Title VII included sex as a protected category;
however, the statute did so without much consideration for whether, or
how, it would provide pregnancy protections in employment.9 In the
early 1970s, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
began to rule pregnancy leave should be granted regardless of employer
policies on leave for illness.10 EEOC regulations provided that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy could violate Title VII by: (1)
denying women access to work because of pregnancy, (2) firing or
refusing to hire a woman because of her pregnancy, or (3) prohibiting
women from taking leave or providing inadequate leave that resulted in
the employee‘s termination.11 One theory behind the EEOC regulations
is that providing no leave or inadequate leave violated Title VII due to
the disparate impact of the policy on women.12 In effect, the EEOC
provisions of 1972 allowed women to take pregnancy leave even when
employers offered no leave at all.13
These provisions did not survive very long. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that excluding pregnancy from
a temporary disability insurance plan did not violate Title VII because
the denial of benefits was not based on sex.14 In 1976, the Supreme
Court followed Geduldig and overturned the EEOC regulations
interpreting Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. In Gilbert, the
Court held that an employer‘s exclusion of benefits for pregnancy was
not sex discrimination under Title VII.15 The majority reasoned the plan
excluding pregnancy was not discriminatory against women because
there ―is no risk from which men are protected and women are not . . . it
8. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–431 (1971); see also McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
9. Ann O‘Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 18 (2007).
10. Id. at 20.
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a)–(c) (1979); see also O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 21.
12. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 21.
13. Id.
14. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2006).
15. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2006).
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is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this
scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not
receive benefits.‖16
In response to Gilbert and Geduldig, Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978, explicitly including discrimination
based on pregnancy as a violation of Title VII. 17 The PDA states that
discrimination ―because of sex‖ includes discrimination ―on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.‖ 18 The PDA
provides that women affected by pregnancy and related conditions
―shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.‖19 Congress added the PDA to Title VII to ensure that women
would not be hindered in job advancement because of pregnancy. 20 The
legislative history accompanying the PDA expresses congressional
intent to achieve the ―full realization of equal employment
opportunity.‖21
Shortly after the passage of the PDA, a Montana district court
interpreted the PDA to incorporate the disparate impact theory in MillerWohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry.22 The court stated
that a one-year service requirement for disability leave would leave an
employer subject to a disparate impact claim by pregnant women.
While this decision was vacated and remanded as a state law issue, 23 the
Montana court handling the remand maintained that the employer‘s noleave policy violated the PDA and the state maternity statute under a
16. Id.
17. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 22.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
19. Id.
20. Jamie L. Clanton, Note, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy Discrimination at Work:
Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What It Says,” 86 IOWA L. REV. 703, 726 (2001) (citing Samuel
Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of
Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2181 (1994)).
21. Clanton, supra note 20, at 727 (citing Staff of Senate Comm. On Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 iii
(Comm. Print 1980)).
22. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm‘r. of Labor and Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (D. Mont.
1981), vacated and dismissed, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982), remanded, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984).
23. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm‘r of Labor and Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982),
remanded, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/7

4

Monroe: OHIO‘S ?PREGNANCY-BLIND? LEAVE POLICY: THE PUBLIC POLICY RAMIFICA

2011]

CASENOTE—OHIO‘S ―PREGNANCY BLIND‖ LEAVE POLICY

271

disparate impact theory.24 In another case, Abraham v. Graphic Arts
International Union, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that ―[a]n
employer can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of an adequate
leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it does have.‖25
In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a California statute requiring employers to
provide up to four months of unpaid pregnancy disability leave.26 The
Court determined that Congress intended the PDA to be the minimum
protection for pregnant workers, not a ceiling preventing states from
taking further measures.27 The Supreme Court further held that the PDA
does not require preferential treatment for pregnant workers. Instead,
the Court stated the PDA allows measures that advance the legislation‘s
purpose of achieving equal employment opportunity for women.28
Despite the Court‘s ruling in Guerra, more recent decisions have held
that Title VII allows facially neutral leave policies despite their failure
to provide any pregnancy leave. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected a disparate impact claim based on a policy allowing
only three days of leave within the first ninety days of employment. 29
Other circuit cases have denied protection to pregnant workers on the
grounds that the PDA does not require employers to treat pregnant
workers better than other workers.30 Advocates soon realized that new
legislation was necessary to provide job protection for pregnant women,
and Congress responded by enacting the Family and Medical Leave
Act.31

24. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm‘r of Labor and Indus., 692 P.2d 1243, 1251–52 (Mont.
1984).
25. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int‘l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
26. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 276–92 (1987).
27. Id. at 285.
28. Id. at 286–89.
29. Stout v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the claim that
all or substantially all pregnant women would by negatively impacted by the policy, reasoning that such
a holding would ―transform the PDA into a guarantee of medical leave for pregnant employees,
something we have specifically held the PDA does not do‖).
30. See e.g., Troupe v. May Dep‘t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
31. See Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: GenderNeutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 468 (2008).
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B. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for the birth or care of an
employee‘s child.32 The FMLA was motivated by the decision in
Guerra, which had struck down the California statute mandating four
months of unpaid pregnancy leave.33 Congressman Berman, author of
the California legislation, called for federal laws to guaranteeing
pregnant women the right to take temporary disability leave without
losing their jobs.34 However, this request reignited the strict equality
versus accommodation debate among feminists.35 Feminists supporting
a strict equality approach worried accommodation statutes would lead to
implicit discrimination against women of childbearing age because the
potential for leave would make them more expensive to hire.36 Other
feminist advocates saw an accommodation model as a way to ensure
women had an equal opportunity to participate in the job market.37
The House of Representatives recognized that the limited protections
provided by the PDA were inadequate for workers whose employers did
not offer leave or disability policies and designed the FMLA to fill the
gaps remaining in the PDA.38 However, by the time the FMLA was
actually enacted, it had lost this focus. Lobbying for small business
exemptions, part-time employee exemptions, and a one-year
32. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611–2612 (West 2011).
33. Ann O‘Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 39 (2007).
34. Tamar Lewin, Maternity Leave: Is It Leave, Indeed?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1984, § 3, at 1,
col. 2.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985).
37. Lewin, supra note 34. The article quotes San Francisco's Employment Law Center attorney
Linda Krieger, ''We are the only industrialized nation that doesn't provide paid maternity leave as a
matter of national policy . . . . I don't see why it should be illegal sex discrimination to fire a woman
because she gets pregnant, but acceptable to tell her she loses her job if she takes off a few weeks for
childbirth. In the real world, it's the same thing. The point isn't that men and women must be treated
alike, it's that they must have equal opportunities. When it comes to pregnancy, equal treatment means
inequality for women.'' Lewin, supra note 34; see also Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The
Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983).
38. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 18.
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probationary period for FMLA eligibility chopped away provisions
necessary to protect many workers, especially in jobs more often held by
women.39 Despite the positive changes the FMLA created, it still does
not cover employers with less than fifty employees or part-time
workers.40 The workers not covered by the FMLA disproportionally
include women and lower-income workers.41 Women are also less
likely to meet the one-year service requirement, since childbearing and
other family needs make women more likely to change jobs or come in
and out of the work force.42 In total, the FMLA only covers 46% of
workers.43
C. Ohio Law
Ohio‘s version of Title VII, Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A),
provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer
to refuse to hire a person, discharge a person without just cause, or
otherwise discriminate against a person with respect to terms or
conditions of employment because of the person‘s sex.44
In 1980, the Ohio General Assembly adopted § 4112.01(B), Ohio‘s
version of the PDA, articulating that ―because of sex‖ in § 4112.02(A)
means ―because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out
of and occurring during the course of a pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.‖45
Section 4112.04(A)(4) empowers the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
(OCRC) to adopt ―rules to effectuate the provisions of [§ 4112] and the
policies and practice of the commission in connection with this
chapter.‖46 Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05 clarifies the rights of
39. Id. at 43–45. One-fourth of employed women work part time, compared to only one-tenth of
employed men, and women constitute two-thirds of the part-time workforce. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611–2612 (West 2011).
41. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 39.
42. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: GenderNeutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 475 (2008).
43. Id.
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2010).
45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (LexisNexis 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2010).
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2010).
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pregnant employees under Chapter 4112.47 Section 4112-5-05(G)(2)
provides, ―Where termination of employment of an employee who is
temporarily disabled due to pregnancy or a related medical condition is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no
maternity leave is available, such termination shall constitute unlawful
sex discrimination.‖48 While § 4112-5-05(G)(2) seemingly mandates
maternity leave, paragraph (G)(5) of the same rule contemplates an
employer instituting a minimum length of service requirement.49
Paragraph (G)(5) specifies that when an employee qualifies for leave,
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for
leave. The rule elaborates: ―For example, if the female meets the
equally applied minimum length of service requirements for leave time,
she must be granted a reasonable leave on account of childbearing.‖50
Any perceived inconsistency between these provisions could be resolved
by paragraph (G)(6), which provides, ―Notwithstanding paragraphs
(G)(1) to (G)(5) of this rule, if the employer has no leave policy,
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for
leave of absence for a female employee for a reasonable period of
time.‖51
47. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05 (2010).
48. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(2) (2010).
49. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(5) (2010) (―Women shall not be penalized in their
conditions of employment because they require time away from work on account of childbearing.
When, under the employer's leave policy the female employee would qualify for leave, then
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for leave of absence for female
employees for a reasonable period of time. For example, if the female meets the equally applied
minimum length of service requirements for leave time, she must be granted a reasonable leave on
account of childbearing. Conditions applicable to her leave (other than its length) and to her return to
employment shall be in accordance with the employer's leave policy.‖).
50. Id.
51. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(6) (2010). In 2004, the OCRC adopted Technical
Policy T-29 which created a rebuttable presumption that a twelve week leave is reasonable and
sufficient. See Thomas H. Barnard and Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers and
the Workplace—Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 197, 220
(2009). This Casenote will not address the controversy in 2007 and 2008 over the OCRC‘s attempts to
define a ―reasonable period of time‖ for pregnancy leave required by R.C. 4112 as twelve weeks, since
such a provision would be obsolete after the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in McFee that employers have to
offer pregnancy leave only to the extent they offer other disability leave. See James Nash, Pregnancyleave
Change
Still
Unresolved,
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Dec.
31,
2008),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2008/12/31/CIVIL.ART_ART_12-3108_B1_PLCCQH9.html. James Nash, Maternity Leave Plan Shot Down, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Dec.
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State and federal courts interpreted these rules to require reasonable
maternity leave, whether or not the employer had a disability leave
policy.52 In McConaughy v. Boswell Oil, Ohio‘s First District Court of
Appeals held that under § 4112-5-05(G)(5)-(6), a female employee must
be granted reasonable maternity leave regardless of internal policy. 53
Additionally, the Southern District of Ohio noted in Woodworth v.
Concord Management that ―[d]enial of maternity leave mandated by the
Ohio Administrative Code ‗is, in effect, terminating the employee
because of her pregnancy.‘‖54
Before McFee, Ohio courts disagreed on what facts a plaintiff must
show to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. Some
courts held the plaintiff must ―assert that (1) she was pregnant, (2)
discharged, and (3) replaced by nonpregnant personnel.‖55 On the other
hand, some courts held that to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination under § 4112.02, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she
was pregnant, (2) she was discharged, and (3) a nonpregnant employee
similar in ability or inability to work was treated differently. 56 Once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.57
If the defendant provides a legitimate reason for termination, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason was a pretext
for unlawful discrimination.58
4, 2007), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2007/12/04/MATERNITY.ART_ART_12-0407_A1_KR8LSRL.html.
52. Frantz v. Beechmont Pet Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); McConaughy v.
Boswell Oil Co., 711 N.E.2d 719, 725 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Dirham v. Van Wert Cnty. Hosp., No.
3:99cv07485, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6417 at *9–12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2000); Woodworth v. Concord
Mgmt., 164 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Morse v. Sudan, Inc., No. 66032, 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3480 at *8–9 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1994).
53. McConaughy, 711 N.E.2d at 725.
54. Woodworth, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
55. Dirham, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11; see also Frantz, 690 N.E.2d at 901; Marvel
Consultants, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 639 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
56. Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable, 812 N.E.2d 976, 983–84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see
also Priest v. TFH-EB, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (―While Ohio courts often
employ the ‗comparable employee‘ analysis for the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in
pregnancy discrimination cases, at least one Ohio court has used the ‗replacement‘ analysis to determine
if the prima facie test was met.‖).
57. Hollingsworth, 812 N.E.2d at 984.
58. Id.
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III. MCFEE V. NURSING CARE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA
Tiffany McFee had worked for Pataskala Oaks for eight months when
she requested leave due to a pregnancy-related condition.59 However,
Pataskala Oaks‘s leave policy required employees have at least one year
of service before they could take leave.60 As the Fifth District Court of
Appeals noted, assuming a normal gestation period, McFee was five to
seven weeks pregnant at the time she was hired.61 She was fired three
days after she gave birth and six days after she went on leave.62
McFee filed a charge with the (OCRC) alleging unlawful termination
due to her pregnancy. The OCRC held that McFee‘s termination
violated Ohio‘s laws against pregnancy discrimination because
maternity leave caused her termination.63 The Licking County Court of
Common Pleas reversed the OCRC, citing Ohio Administrative Code
§ 4112-5-05(G)(4),64
which
provides
that
―Employment
policies . . . shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy and childbirth
on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary
leaves of absence of the same classification under such employment
policies . . . .‖65 The trial court held that termination of a pregnant
employee due solely to her need for maternity leave was not a
termination because of pregnancy.66
On appeal, the OCRC argued that under O.A.C. § 4112-5-05(G)(2),
an employer must provide reasonable maternity leave regardless of its
leave policy.67 The Fifth District Court of Appeals agreed, holding that
O.A.C. § 4112-5-05(G)(2) required employers to provide maternity
leave for a reasonable period of time, consistent with the purpose of

59. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (Ohio 2010).
60. Id.
61. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n., 910 N.E.2d 482, 483 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio
2010).
62. Nursing Care Mgmt.of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 483.
63. Id. at 483–484.
64. Id.
65. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(4) (2010).
66. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 488–89.
67. Id.
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Chapter 4112 to promote equal employment opportunities for women.68
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and held that a uniformly applied
minimum-length-of-service leave requirement did not violate Chapter
4112.69 The court cited federal cases holding that the PDA did not
require preferential treatment for pregnant employees.70 Since
§ 4112.01(B) mirrors the PDA, case law interpreting the PDA is
generally applicable to the Ohio provision.71 Therefore, the court
reasoned that Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 also did not require the
preferential treatment of providing leave to pregnant employees when
others similar in their ability or inability to work were not offered
leave.72
The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed with the appellate court that
McFee‘s termination constituted direct evidence of discrimination.73
The court ruled that direct evidence of discrimination is ―evidence that
proves that discrimination has occurred without requiring further
inferences.‖74 Since the parties agreed that McFee was terminated
because she took leave from work even though she was not eligible,
McFee did not present direct evidence of discrimination.75 The court
concluded that the employer‘s leave policy was not direct evidence of
sex discrimination because it is ―pregnancy-blind,‖ meaning the policy
does not treat pregnant employees differently from employees ―not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.‖76 In so holding,
the court rejected the OCRC‘s argument that the ―treated the same‖
clause of § 4112.01(B) must be read separate from the first sentence
prohibiting termination ―because of or on the basis of pregnancy.‖ 77
Instead, the court held that the treated-the-same clause is an explanation
68. Id. at 488–89.
69. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ohio 2010).
70. Id. at 1073.
71. Id. (citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Join Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm‘n, 421 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1981)).
72. McFee, 931 N.E.2d at 1073.
73. Id.
74. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (Ohio 2010) (quoting
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d 637, 640–641 (6th Cir. 2006)).
75. Id. at 1077.
76. Id. (citing Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 640–641 (6th Cir. 2006)).
77. Id. at 1073.
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and application of the because-of-pregnancy clause.78 According to the
court, both sentences served the same goal: ―to ensure that employees
who are pregnant are not discriminated against on the basis of
pregnancy.‖79 The court reasoned that ―[t]o hold otherwise would be to
require that employers treat pregnant employees more favorably than
other employees.‖80 Thus, the court deemed the employer‘s pregnancyblind policy was not direct evidence of discrimination and stated that
McFee was terminated for taking unauthorized leave, not because of her
pregnancy.81
When construing the OCRC rules, the court interpreted O.A.C.
§ 4112-5-05(G)(5) to be incongruent with (G)(2). The court relied on
paragraph (G)(5) as evidence that (G)(2) does not mandate reasonable
leave because it contemplates that a uniform minimum-length-of-service
requirement for leave eligibility is permissible. According to statutory
construction, the court held it must resolve the ambiguity in a manner
that gives effect to both provisions.82 This led the court to rule that
O.A.C. 4112-5-05(G)(2) ―must mean that when an employee is
otherwise eligible for leave, the employer cannot lawfully terminate that
employee for violating a policy that provides no leave‖ for pregnancy or
a related condition.83
The Supreme Court of Ohio further held that O.A.C. § 4112-5-05(G)
cannot require employers to provide maternity leave because that
mandate would exceed the statutory authority of the Civil Rights
Commission.84
Claiming the OCRC‘s interpretation requires
preferential treatment for pregnant workers, the court ruled the
regulations exceed the public policy Chapter 4112, which is for
employers to treat pregnant employees the same as nonpregnant
employees.85

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1074.
Id.
McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (Ohio 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Id. at 1075.
McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (Ohio 2010).
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IV. DISCUSSION
This Part will discuss the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in McFee
and will analyze it as an example of the inadequate protection current
discrimination laws provide to pregnant employees. First, subpart A
will argue that the result of the court‘s decision is inconsistent with
§ 4112.02(A). Second, subpart B will show that the contemplation of a
one-year service requirement in (G)(5) need not be interpreted to take
the reasonable leave mandate out of (G)(2) and (G)(6). Third, subpart C
will examine McFee in light of the purpose of the PDA, which is to
promote equal employment opportunity for women. Fourth, subpart D
will consider in more detail how a pregnancy-blind policy can still be
discriminatory. Finally, subpart E will conclude with a brief comparison
of Ohio‘s post-McFee pregnancy leave policy to that of other states and
developed nations.
A. McFee Is Inconsistent With Revised Code Section 4112.02(A)
Prior to McFee, federal and Ohio courts had held that the Ohio
Administrative Code ―plainly indicates that new mothers must be
granted a reasonable leave on account of childbearing‖ and that denial
of such leave ―is, in effect, terminating the employee because of her
pregnancy.‖86 In McFee‘s case, if not for her pregnancy, it is fair to
assume she would not have been terminated. The only way the
prohibition on discrimination in § 4112.02(A) can be followed is by
adopting the Ohio Civil Rights Commission‘s interpretation of O.A.C.
4112-5-05(G)(2). A no-leave policy is virtually impossible for a
pregnant employee to follow because childbirth necessitates time away
from work.87
Section 4112.02(A), in conjunction with § 4112.01(B), explicitly
prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a pregnant applicant because

86. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio
2010).
87. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J.
567, 582 (2010).
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of pregnancy or from firing an employee because of her pregnancy.88
However, a one-year minimum service requirement for leave eligibility
allows employers to terminate or refuse to hire pregnant employees or
applicants due solely to the need for maternity leave that directly results
from pregnancy. Failing to require employers to provide pregnancy
leave violates § 4112.02 by condoning the termination of employees
because of their pregnancy.
In addition, § 4112.08 requires courts to construe Chapter 4112
―liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, and any law
inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.‖ 89
Furthermore, § 1.11 provides that ―[r]emedial laws and all proceedings
under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object
and assist the parties in obtaining justice.‖90 Accordingly, courts should
interpret Ohio‘s pregnancy discrimination law to fulfill its purpose—
protecting pregnant workers—and construe the law liberally to require
maternity leave for a reasonable period of time. To deny maternity
leave is to deny pregnant women substantial equality of employment
opportunity contrary to the goals of Chapter 4112. Therefore, the Fifth
District Ohio Court of Appeals correctly held that McFee‘s termination
constituted direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination.91
B. The Reasonable Leave Required by Ohio Administrative Code
Sections 4112-5-05(G)(2) and (G)(6) Was Consistent With (G)(5) and
Was Within the Scope of Revised Code Section 4112.02(A)
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on O.A.C. 4112-5-05(G)(5) as
evidence that (G)(2) does not require reasonable leave because it
contemplates that a uniform minimum-length-of-service requirement for
leave eligibility is permissible. According to statutory construction, the
court held it must resolve the ambiguity in a manner that gives effect to
both provisions.92 This led the court to rule that O.A.C. 4112-505(G)(2) ―must mean that when an employee is otherwise eligible for
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2010).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (LexisNexis 2010).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (LexisNexis 2010).
Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 489.
McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (Ohio 2010).
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leave, the employer cannot lawfully terminate that employee for
violating a policy that provides no leave‖ for pregnancy or a related
condition.93 However, as noted by the Ohio Court of Appeals for the
First
District
in
McConaughy,
(G)(6)
explicitly states,
―[n]otwithstanding paragraphs (G)(1) to (G)(5) of this rule, if the
employer has no leave policy, childbearing must be considered by the
employer to be a justification for leave of absence for a female
employee for a reasonable period of time.‖94 The O.A.C. provided this
separate section for the sole purpose of clarifying that reasonable
maternity leave is required and that any apparent inconsistency in
provisions (G)(1) through (G)(5) does not override this requirement.
Additionally, the alleged tension between (G)(2) and (G)(5) can be
eradicated without taking the leave requirement out of (G)(2). The
clause contemplating a minimum length of service requirement in (G)(5)
is preceded by the words ―[f]or example.‖95 This introductory phrase
demonstrates that the provision intends to clarify what is required when
an employer elects to offer disability leave. Contemplating this situation
does not negate what § 4112-5-05 requires in other situations, especially
since the provisions require the same thing—that employers offer their
employees pregnancy leave.
This is especially apparent when
considering the preceding sentence, and what the minimum length of
service contemplation seeks to illuminate: ―When, under the employer's
leave policy the female employee would qualify for leave, then
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for
leave of absence . . . .‖96 Paragraph (G)(5) can be interpreted as
requiring employers who offer leave to also offer pregnancy leave,
while (G)(2) and (G)(6) provide that even if an employer does not offer
other leave, it must offer pregnancy leave. The separate provisions
cover different situations, but all require employers to offer reasonable
maternity leave. In addition, as the Fifth District Court of Appeals
noted, ―[A] reviewing court must give deference to an administrative
agency‘s interpretation of its own rules and regulations where such
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the plain language of the
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(6) (2010).
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(5) (2010).
Id.
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statute and rule.‖97 The Supreme Court of Ohio, on the other hand,
found that interpreting the OCRC rules as mandating pregnancy leave
violates the Ohio constitution by exceeding the statutory authority
granted by the Ohio General Assembly. Specifically, the rules thus
interpreted would ―expand the public policy set by the legislature‖ that
pregnant employees be treated the same as other employees, not
preferentially.98 As a result, the court found it must interpret the rules as
only requiring employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other
employees similar in their ability to work.
C. The Decision in McFee Contradicts the Purpose of § 4112.02(A)
While the Supreme Court of Ohio claimed the purposes of O.R.C.
§ 4112.02(A) and the PDA are to treat pregnant persons the same as
nonpregnant persons, a broader purpose of Title VII and Chapter 4112 is
to promote the equal employment opportunity of women. Section
4112.02 is similar to the PDA, and the court has held that federal case
law interpreting Title VII is generally applicable to Chapter 4112
cases.99 Accordingly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals took note of a
U.S. Supreme Court decision on a similar issue. In California Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a California law requiring employers to provide unpaid pregnancy
disability leave was not inconsistent with Title VII because: (1) the PDA
was intended by Congress to provide a floor, not a ceiling, for
pregnancy benefits and (2) the leave mandate was in line with Title
VII‘s intent to promote equal employment opportunity. 100 The Fifth
District Court of Appeals quoted Justice Stevens‘s concurring opinion in
Guerra, noting that while the plain words of the PDA seem to mandate
treating pregnant employees the same as other employees, the U.S.
Supreme Court previously rejected that argument and held that Title VII
prohibits all preferential treatment of the disadvantaged classes that the
97. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2009).
98. McFee, 931 N.E.2d at 1075.
99. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Join
Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 421 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1981)).
100. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987).
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statute was enacted to protect.101 Justice Stevens argued that while the
statutory language ―seems to mandate treating pregnant employees the
same as other employees‖ one cannot ―ignore the fact the PDA is a
definitional section of Title VII's prohibition against gender-based
discrimination.‖102 Justice Stevens refused to accept the proposition
that the PDA requires absolute neutrality, but instead allows, like
other parts of Title VII, preferential treatment of the disadvantaged
class so long as it is consistent with accomplishing the legislative
goal.103 Accordingly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals agreed with the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission that the reasonable leave requirement in
paragraph (G)(5) ―is consistent with the goals of the PDA and R.C.
§ 4112.02 by promoting equal employment opportunity by ensuring that
women will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy disability.‖104
The fact that the PDA was a congressional response to Gilbert is
further evidence that equal employment opportunity is the true goal of
the legislation. In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that excluding
pregnancy from disability coverage was not sex discrimination under
Title VII because the disparate treatment was not gender-based.105 The
Court considered the distinction in treatment as comparing pregnant and
nonpregnant persons, not women and men, because men cannot become
pregnant and not all women will become pregnant.106 Since both
women and men can be nonpregnant, singling out pregnancy is not
gender discrimination. This reasoning, as legal scholar Deborah
Anthony describes, ―represents an intentional self-delusion as to both
biological and social reality, manifested in a requirement that
discrimination cannot take place unless similarly situated groups are
treated differently.‖107
The PDA is, therefore, a congressional
101. Nursing Care Mgmt. of America, Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 487 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 293 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
102. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 293–94 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103. Id.
104. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2009).
105. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2006).
106. Id. at 134–35.
107. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: GenderNeutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 464–65 (2008).
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instruction to courts to move away from the pregnant-nonpregnant
distinction used in Gilbert, as well as a congressional recognition that
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. Indeed, the comments
of PDA sponsor Senator Williams, cited by the Supreme Court in
Guerra, support this conclusion: ―The entire thrust . . . behind this
legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to
full participation in family life.‖108 The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled
the regulations exceed the public policy addressed in § 4112.02 and
§ 4112.01 because the purpose of those policies is to treat pregnant
employees the same as nonpregnant employees.109 However, if the
public policy of § 4112.02(A) is, like its corresponding federal
legislation, to ensure equal employment opportunity for women, then
the reverse is true: if § 4112-5-05 does not require reasonable maternity
leave, the rule does not fulfill the statutory duty the OCRC has been
given by the Ohio General Assembly.
D. A Pregnancy-Blind Policy Can Still Be Discriminatory
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled McFee was terminated because she
took leave for which she was ineligible, not because she was pregnant.
This is, as the court said, a pregnancy-blind policy, but this policy is also
discrimination-blind. Comparing pregnant workers to nonpregnant
workers disguises the gender discrimination inherent in a situation
where a woman—and only a woman—can be fired because of
pregnancy. A lack of pregnancy leave can place a female employee in a
position of choosing between her job and the continuation of her
pregnancy; an implicit ultimatum that the Fifth District Court of Appeals
noted is ―a dilemma which would never face a male employee in the
first year of employment.‖110 The Fifth District Court of Appeals also
noted that ―[b]oth sexes are entitled to have a family without losing their
jobs; to hold otherwise would be to completely ignore the plain
108. Id. at 466.
109. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (Ohio 2010).
110. Nursing Care Mgmt. of America, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 489
(Ohio Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069
(Ohio 2010).
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language of Ohio Admin. Code 4112-5-05(G)(2),‖111 and would
completely counteract the goals of the PDA and Chapter 4112.
By ignoring how pregnancy affects genders differently, society loses
sight of why pregnancy protection exists in the first place. Whether or
not a woman is pregnant at the time she is hired or knows she is
pregnant at the time she is hired, McFee holds that she will face
termination or denial of hire in three scenarios a male employee would
never encounter. First, a female applicant could be unknowingly
pregnant when she accepts a position with an employer operating under
a one-year no-leave policy. At some point within her first year,
assuming her pregnancy continues, she will need time off to give birth
and could be terminated because she was pregnant. A second possibility
is that a female applicant knows she is pregnant when she accepts the
position and discloses this to the employer. If the employer refuses to
hire her because she will not be able to comply with the no-leave policy,
the employer is in effect refusing to hire her because of her pregnancy.
Finally, if a new female employee becomes pregnant within her first few
months of employment, she could face termination for taking leave to
give birth. New male employees would not face any of these scenarios,
demonstrating how the no-leave policy disguises pregnancy
discrimination and inhibits the equal employment opportunity of
women. Even if a woman is neither pregnant nor intending to become
pregnant at the time she is hired, a no-leave policy in effect compels
women to guarantee to not become pregnant. In such a scenario, it
places a woman in the position of choosing a family or employment,
which runs counter to the purpose of the legislation.
The above scenarios demonstrate that comparing pregnant workers to
nonpregnant workers rather than male employees to female employees
disguises the gender discrimination inherent in denying maternity leave.
The Supreme Court of Ohio utilized a pregnant versus nonpregnant
comparison to show that providing maternity leave, but not other types
of leave, is preferential treatment. However, comparing pregnant to
nonpregnant persons, instead of women to men, allows women to be
equal only to the extent that they are like men—in this case, to the

111. Id.
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extent they are not pregnant.112 Comparing how males and females are
situated differently under the same no-leave policy reveals how
requiring maternity leave places males and females on equal ground. It
places women in the same position as men, i.e., not facing the risk of
losing a job because of pregnancy.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that McFee had to make her claim
under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, which required her to
establish that a nonpregnant employee similar in ability or inability to
work was treated differently.113 However, this reasoning subscribes
to the pregnant versus nonpregnant comparison used in Gilbert.
Congress addressed the inadequate protection this distinction
provides when it enacted the PDA in response to Gilbert. The PDA‘s
mandate of equal treatment for pregnant employees has been difficult to
apply to cases because there is no male equivalent to pregnancy. 114 In
addition, using the similarly situated requirement implicitly encourages
treating different groups of people differently, which contradicts the
objective of all anti-discrimination laws.115 In any event, no other
employee is truly similarly situated to a pregnant woman forced to
choose between continuing her pregnancy and keeping her job. Even
if one assumes an employee with a similar disability exists, it is less
likely that the most vulnerable groups of female employees—those
outside the scope of the FMLA—will be able to find an instance of a
similarly situated employee at a small employer.
This difficulty in finding a similarly situated employee is the reason
some courts have held that women making a claim under the PDA can
utilize a disparate impact theory. In Abraham v. Graphic Arts
International Union, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found an
employer‘s policy of allowing only a ten-day leave discriminated
against pregnant employees despite the policy‘s equal application to
both pregnant and nonpregnant employees.116 The court found that the
policy had a drastic effect on pregnant employees that ―clashes violently
112. Anthony, supra note 31, at 493.
113. McFee, 931 N.E.2d at 1076–1077.
114. Sarah Stewart Holland, Comment, Pregnancy in Pieces: The Potential Gap in State and
Federal Pregnancy Leave, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 443, 461 (2006).
115. Anthony, supra note 31, at 492.
116. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int‘l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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with the letter as well as the spirit of Title VII.‖ 117 Under a disparate
impact theory, an employee can prove discrimination based on the
disparate impact of a facially neutral policy on a protected group, like
pregnant women.118 Unlike a disparate treatment theory, an employee is
not required to prove that the employer had a discriminatory motive. 119
In a disparate impact case, the employer can defend itself by proving the
practice is a job-related necessity, but the employee can still prevail if
she can prove the existence of a lesser discriminatory policy that would
―serve the employer‘s legitimate interest in ‗efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.‘‖120 However, the Supreme Court has never explicitly
declared the disparate impact theory applicable to pregnancy
discrimination claims and lower courts are divided on the issue.121 Even
if an employee is allowed to argue disparate impact, many courts have
stated the PDA requires only equal treatment of pregnant and
nonpregnant employees.122 Using this comparison, courts are unlikely
to find evidence of discrimination.123
The Supreme Court noted in Nevada v. Hibbs that when passing the
FMLA, Congress responded to the failure of the PDA to adequately
address gender discrimination.124 Congress chose to go beyond a strictequality approach like that of Title VII, which would not adequately
address gender discrimination because ―[s]uch a law would allow States
to provide for no family leave at all.‖125 That is the situation for women
who constitute a disproportionate number of the 46% of workers who
are not protected by the FMLA and the women who are more likely than
men to fall below the one-year service requirement.126 The strict
equality, pregnancy-blind approach is not fulfilling the promise of equal
117. Id.
118. Sarah Stewart Holland, Comment, Pregnancy in Pieces: The Potential Gap in State and
Federal Pregnancy Leave, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 443, 451 (2006).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Nev. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003).
125. Id. at 738.
126. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: GenderNeutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y& L. 459, 475 (2008).
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employment opportunity for women. This is demonstrated by the fact
that women, such as McFee, are terminated because of leave
necessitated as a direct result of pregnancy. In Hibbs, the Supreme
Court made clear that Congress has the authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to address family leave needs that have
precluded women from equal participation in the labor market. The
Court further acknowledged that a policy of mere non-discrimination
would fail to create real employment equality.127
E. Pregnancy Leave in Other States and Countries
Two states have adopted rules prohibiting termination of employment
because of pregnancy when an employer offers no leave or inadequate
leave by regulation,128 and three other states require reasonable leave by
statute.129 The scarcity of state laws ensuring equal employment
opportunity by mandating unpaid leave for pregnant workers is partly
explained by the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act, even
though as discussed above, the FMLA fails to protect a great number of
workers, which disproportionately include women. Some states have
passed laws that protect workers who fall outside the scope of the
FMLA, like California‘s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which
requires all private employers with five or more employees to provide
up to four months of unpaid, job-protected leave for pregnancy-related
medical conditions, including childbirth.130 Congress has the ability to
take further action to protect pregnant workers from losing their jobs.
The United States is the only modern country worldwide without paid

127. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735–38.
128. HAW. CODE. R. § 12-46-108 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-30-020(4)(b)
(2010) (noting the disparate impact that inadequate leave policies have on women, stating: ―There may
be circumstances when the application of the employer's general leave policy to pregnancy or childbirth
will not afford equal opportunity for women and men. One circumstance would be where the employer
allows no leave for any sickness or other disability by any employee, or so little leave time that a
pregnant woman must terminate employment. Because such a leave policy has a disparate impact on
women, it is an unfair practice, unless the policy is justified by business necessity.‖).
129. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 2010), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2010), MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (2010).
130. CAL. GOV‘T CODE §12926(d), 12945(a) (West 2010).
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maternity leave for employees.131 As early as 1989, most Western
countries ―provided paid leave, including Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.‖132 Many workers in the United States, however, do
not even have unpaid leave available and may face termination as a
result of pregnancy if they are part of the 46% of workers not covered
by the FMLA.
V. CONCLUSION
Without the availability of disparate impact theory under the PDA
and state statutes based on the PDA, workers need new legislation to
prevent pregnancy discrimination. Until Congress makes the FMLA
more inclusive, states have the responsibility to protect their workers
against sex and pregnancy discrimination.
Congress, and states like Ohio with PDA language in their
employment discrimination statutes, could amend the PDA to codify the
disparate impact theory and make clear that women are protected against
job discrimination even when employers have a no-leave policy. The
same is true for FMLA and state laws based on the FMLA that can be
amended to provide all employees a reasonable amount of leave to bear
a child and physically recover.133 In Ohio, the legislature could restore
the protections the Ohio Administrative Code provided to women by
codifying the language of Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05(G)(6):
―[I]f the employer has no leave policy, childbearing must be considered
by the employer to be a justification for leave of absence for a female
employee for a reasonable period of time.‖134 Until such actions are
taken, the goals of Title VII and state companion legislation will not be
realized, and employment inequality between the genders will persist.

131. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: GenderNeutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 483 (2008).
132. Id.
133. Ann O‘Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 58 (2007).
134. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(6) (2010).
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